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The ‘war on drugs’ has failed. Despite an increase in law enforcement, production 
levels of coca – the crop used to make cocaine – have hardly altered in the last 
decade. A 2017 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime found 
that coca cultivation in Colombia had increased by 52 per cent; thus, there is 
an urgent need to find alternative policies to counter illicit behaviour. Research 
by the Institute of Development Studies found that regions in Colombia with a 
higher level of land titling, where people who have worked land for many years 
are given formal ownership of it, witnessed a greater reduction in the area of 
land used to grow coca.
 Does Land Titling Matter? The 
 Role of Land Property Rights 
 in Colombia’s War on Drugs
Coca crops in Colombia 
Colombia is one of the largest coca 
producers in the world. Coca is grown 
primarily on the agricultural frontier, 
where the lack of law enforcement, the 
weak definition of land property rights, 
the abundant natural resources, and 
the high prevalence of poverty create 
a perfect environment to establish 
coca production. It is an industry that 
is based principally on small-scale coca 
growers. While only a small portion of 
total profits remains with the growers, 
the profit they gain from growing coca 
is relatively larger than the profit they 
would generate from any other crop. 
Colombia has witnessed many 
policies aiming to reduce coca 
production, with Plan Colombia 
being the most comprehensive. 
This policy included the seizure of 
raw materials for coca production, 
manual and aerial eradication of coca 
fields, land expropriation, destruction 
of laboratories, interception of 
drug shipments, and promotion of 
alternative development programmes. 
It was complemented by an intense 
counterinsurgency policy, launched 
by President Alvaro Uribe (2002–10). 
Despite this meaningful increase in 
law enforcement across all national 
territories and halting the expansion 
of coca fields, production was hardly 
affected. In fact, nearly the same amount 
of cocaine is being produced on half 
the land that was being used for the 
cultivation of coca crops before Plan 
Colombia was implemented.
Why the ‘war on drugs’ in 
Colombia has failed
Among the different explanations 
for why the ‘war on drugs’ has failed 
in many regions in Colombia, one 
stands out: small-scale coca growers 
have shown persistent illicit behaviour. 
Small-scale coca growers appear to be 
able to learn and adapt rapidly, thereby 
evading the rule of law and reallocating 
their crops. This suggests that small-
scale coca growers follow a persistent 
risk-taking behaviour pattern, whereby 
coca cultivation becomes inelastic to 
increases in perceived risk. Empirical 
research has noted that this behaviour 
cannot be explained solely by monetary 
reasons. Non-monetary variables, such 
as experience with coca cultivation, 
legitimacy of authorities, and religion 
could also be important factors in the 
coca growers’ decision-making process. 
Hence, an increase in law enforcement 
is efficient only if the policies generate 
microeconomic incentives that alter the 
“Small-scale coca 
growers appear 
to be able to 
learn and adapt 
rapidly, thereby 
evading the 
rule of law and 
reallocating 
their crops.”
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Policy recommendations
• Policies focusing on the strength of alternative social arrangements such as 
land property rights are an effective alternative to counter illicit behaviour such 
as coca production. For Colombia and other drug-producing countries, land 
rights formalisation presents an effective alternative to other policies such 
as aerial eradication, which have been proven not only ineffective but also 
counterproductive.
• Formal property rights reduce risk-taking behaviour. To reduce this behaviour 
long-term, an increase in law enforcement is an important complement for the 
most traditional policy action for rural development; in particular, in those contexts 
where illegal activities co-exist with formal and informal property rights.
risk-taking behaviour of coca growers, 
thereby restoring the link between small-
scale coca growers and the state. In such 
a context, the strength of land property 
rights might have had an important role in 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the war 
on illegal crops in Colombia.
The unintended effect of land 
formalisation on illicit crops
Between 1995 and 2000, a joint effort 
by the Colombian government and the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
called the Program for Land Titling and 
Modernization of the Registry of Deed 
and Cadastre took place. This initiative 
aimed to increase the coverage of 
cadastral information (a cadastral map 
or survey providing information on the 
extent, value, and ownership of land) and 
the level of formalisation of land property 
rights across the Colombian territory. The 
programme was implemented in about 
one-fifth of the Colombian municipalities, 
leading to an increase in the level of 
formalisation in these areas for a number 
of reasons. The research showed that a 
low presence of the state in most of the 
Colombian regions before 2000 boosted 
the spread of coca crops throughout the 
territory. Once the rule of law increased, 
attempts to reduce coca crops were more 
effective in those municipalities with 
more formalised land property rights. 
Two main mechanisms might explain 
this relationship. First, improved law 
enforcement due to increased state 
presence (e.g. Plan Colombia) could have 
been more attractive to crop growers 
with legal titles because they were 
able to benefit more from alternative 
programmes (both within Plan Colombia 
and outside the scope of this counter-
drug policy); for example, by using land 
as collateral to obtain credit, or by 
substituting illegal crops for low-risk 
cash crops, among others. We call this 
the substitution mechanism. Second, the 
cost of cultivating coca increases due to 
more-severe sanctions. Formal ownership 
implies criminal responsibility for 
landholders who grow coca on their land 
plot, and land titles inherently increase 
land value. Hence, as the government 
expropriates land from landowners who 
grow coca crops, the cost associated with 
expropriation rises. Put simply, land title 
holders have more to lose.
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